De-Nationalize The Sea
George W. Bush has taken one of the most important steps in his environmental, or resource, management policy: he proposed generalizing
Individual Transfer Quotas (ITQ). ITQs fix a given amount of fish that can be caught without putting the viability of this resource in jeopardy. This amount is then divided up and auctioned off in the marketplace.
It is a half-solution, which mocks the market’s behavior without really creating one. But it is a huge advance compared to the purely public management that has ruined many fisheries throughout the world.
Gradually, and without much fanfare, our idea of how we should manage our resources is changing. This is the case for the seafood we consume, and from which we take in a large part of our proteins. The 20th century was the Statist century. Not only in countries where extreme forms of socialism triumphed, but in Western democracies, where individuals’ free initiative was slowly substituted for state imposed orders. Fishing is one more example. The School of Salamanca, in particular Francisco de Vitoria and Vazquez de Mella, established the principle of free and open seas, which has been part of libertarian thought and international law since the 16th century. After World War II, this freedom fell before the onslaught of states’ imperial expansionism. According to the “Truman Doctrine,” from 1945, states had the right to appropriate an extension of water up to 200 miles from their coasts. This policy spread public meddling to marine resources. The result has been inefficient, arbitrary and plain bad management.
The directive making fisheries public has run up against the tragedy of the commons, the proof that when a good belongs to everyone and not private individuals, it gets overexploited. To avoid this undesired consequence, states have introduced all manner of regulations on how to fish, biological work stoppages and other legislative nonsense. They would have all been unnecessary if the seas had been privatized.
But there exists an intermediary solution, satisfactory although not ideal: the ITQs. It approaches private ownership of resources and thereby approximates the only institution allowing for good management of resources. The ITQs have been working since 1979 in Iceland (which depends on fishing to bring in half of the foreign currencies entering the country) with excellent results, both as regards the evolution of production and sustainability over time. Although initially viewed with skepticism, the program’s success has erased many misinformed criticisms, and today boasts wide support. The more recent Australian experience is also proving successful.
In the United Staes, it has been working for some time, but in limited fashion. There, as in other places where ITQs are being used, various species of fish that were on the verge of disappearing have recovered. It might be too much to ask of a European Union crippled by
bureaucratitis, but other countries carrying out pro-market reforms in their fisheries are using ITQs and should provide an example for the EU to follow. Not only would it assure fishing stock sustainability, but it would obviate innumerable arbitrary regulations that more than solve problems, created them.
